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Currently, if a user signed up via OAuth2 and then somehow gets their E-Mail account compromised, their Forgejo account can be taken over by requesting a password reset for their Forgejo account. This PR changes the logic so that a password reset request is denied for a user using OAuth2 if they do not already have a password set. Which should be the case for all users who only ever log in via their Auth-Provider. Reviewed-on: https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/9060 Reviewed-by: Gusted <gusted@noreply.codeberg.org> Co-authored-by: BtbN <btbn@btbn.de> Co-committed-by: BtbN <btbn@btbn.de> |
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.. | ||
2fa.go | ||
auth.go | ||
auth_test.go | ||
linkaccount.go | ||
main_test.go | ||
oauth.go | ||
oauth_test.go | ||
openid.go | ||
password.go | ||
webauthn.go |